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LICHTENBERGER, SPARKS, AND WICKS: THE FUTURE OF
THE PRIVATE SEARCH DOCTRINE
ABSTRACT
Electronic devices are becoming increasingly prevalent in our daily lives,
simultaneously replacing photo albums, address books, printed documents,
and other, previously indispensable items. Electronic devices have even
invaded a controversial area of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: the private
search doctrine. However, this doctrine’s application to electronic devices
suffered from a dearth of existing law. Courts sought to fill this gap using two
primary approaches: the container approach and the particularity approach.
The container approach ignores the modern realities of electronic devices and
the related privacy concerns. In contrast, the particularity approach
accommodates these contemporary realities and increased privacy interests.
This Comment concludes that courts should adopt the particularity approach
to protect individuals from invasive government searches, in the true spirit of
the Fourth Amendment.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court set the stage for modern Fourth Amendment analysis in
the paramount electronic device case Riley v. California.1 The Court observed
that cell phones are now so commonplace that “the proverbial visitor from
Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy.”2 It is
clear to see why the Court made such an observation, as electronic devices3 are
essentially extensions of their owners.4 In addition to holding digital imprints
of electronic device users’ lives, in effect representing an annex of the
memory, the Court noted that “more than 90% of American adults” have cell
phones.5 Thus, the vast majority of Americans uses electronic devices and
inherently recognizes the convenience and power of these devices as the norm
in our society.6 However, the unique Fourth Amendment consequences
associated with these devices are not as facially obvious.7 The constitutional

1

134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014).
Id. Other courts have also commented on the widespread use of cell phones and other technology. See,
e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d
498, 512 (11th Cir. 2015); In re Application for Tel. Info. Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. Supp.
3d 1011, 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2015); United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 556 (D. Md. 2014); In re
Malik J., 193 Cal. Rptr. 3d 370, 375 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015); State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 326 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2016); State v. Tate, 849 N.W.2d 798, 813–14 (Wis. 2014) (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).
3 For the purposes of this Comment, “electronic devices” includes cell phones, tablets, computers, media
storage devices, and other digital devices and technology.
4 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490 (“[N]early three-quarters of smart phone users report being within five
feet of their phones most of the time . . . .”); Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 524 (Fla. 2014). Further,
electronic devices are extensions of their users because people regularly store “a digital record of nearly every
aspect of their lives—from the mundane to the intimate.” Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490; see Leanne Andersen,
People v. Diaz: Warrantless Searches of Cellular Phones, Stretching the Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine
Beyond the Breaking Point, 39 W. ST. U. L. REV. 33, 49 (2011) (explaining that electronic devices are
“extension[s] of our own memory” (quoting United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1000 (C.D. Cal.
2006))).
5 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490 (further explaining that “12% [of smart phone users admit] that they even use
their phones in the shower,” and that “nearly three-quarters of smart phone users report being within five feet
of their phones most of the time”); see Adrianna Patrina Agosta, Note, The Law Catching Up with the
Evolution of Cell Phones: Warrantless Searches of a Cell Phone are Unconstitutional Uunder the Fourth
Amendment, 92 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 131, 131 (2015).
6 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490. In addition, it is becoming rare to encounter someone who does not use
an electronic device. See id.; see also Samuel J. H. Beutler, The New World of Mobile Communication:
Redefining the Scope of Warrantless Cell Phone Searches Incident to Arrest, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
375, 376 (2013) (providing statistics on the widespread use of cell phones).
7 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489–91; see also In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a
Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3rd Cir. 2010) (“[I]t is
unlikely that cell phone customers are aware that their cell phone providers collect and store historical location
information.”).
2
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implications of this widespread technological phenomenon are at the heart of
the Riley opinion and this Comment.
The Riley majority analyzed the constitutional impact of the electronic
device era by identifying two inherent differences between electronic devices
and other types of possessions.8 First, the Court distinguished electronic
devices based on the qualitative disparity between electronic devices and other
items.9 The Court’s analysis of the quantitative inequality centered on the
“immense storage capacit[ies]” of electronic devices.10 In particular, the
“immense storage capacit[ies]” of electronic devices far exceed the previous
physical restrictions on what an individual could carry with them.11 Smart
phones in 2014 could store “millions of pages of text, thousands of pictures, or
hundreds of videos.”12 In comparison, an individual would be hard pressed to
carry around physical copies of that quantity.13 Second, the Supreme Court
noted that electronic devices present distinct Fourth Amendment issues to the
extent that they are qualitatively different from other items.14 Unlike other
items, electronic devices concentrate various categories of personal
information on one device, including “Internet search[es] and browsing
history,”15 location tracking data,16 medical records,17 and many other types of

8 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489 (explaining that cell phones are different from other objects “in both a
quantitative and qualitative sense”).
9 Id. In particular, the Court identified four privacy issues that arise because of the quantitative
differences between cellular phones and other types of objects: (1) cell phones have the potential to
concentrate various types of data on one device, thereby forming a more complete look into the owners’ lives
than looking at each type of data independently; (2) the quantity of each type of data that can be stored on a
cell phone means that “the sum of an individual’s private life can be reconstructed”; (3) the data found on a
cell phone can predate the cell phone itself, providing a historical record of the owners’ lives; and (4) the
“pervasiveness” of electronic devices means that the vast majority of Americans now carry “a digital record”
of their lives by way of their cell phones, as opposed to the few that carried such personal records on their
persons prior to the cell phone phenomenon. Id. at 2489–90.
10 Id. at 2489; see Adam Lamparello & Charles E. MacLean, Riley v. California: Privacy Still Matters,
But How Much and in What Contexts?, 27 REGENT U. L. REV. 25, 31–32 (2014).
11 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489 (“Before cell phones, a search of a person was limited by physical realities
and tended as a general matter to constitute only a narrow intrusion on privacy.”).
12 Id. A cell phone can store the digital equivalent of “four million pages of Microsoft Word documents.”
Charles E. MacLean, But, Your Honor, A Cell Phone Is Not a Cigarette Pack: An Immodest Call for a Return
to the Chimel Justifications for Cell Phone Memory Searches Incident to Lawful Arrest, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV.
41, 46 (2012).
13 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489 (“Most people cannot lug around every piece of mail they have received for
the past several months, every picture they have taken, or every book or article they have read . . . .”).
14 Id. at 2490; see also United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2013) (“[The information stored on
a cell phone] is, by and large, of a highly personal nature . . . .”).
15 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490 (stating such search history “could reveal an individual’s private interests or
concerns—perhaps a search for certain symptoms of disease, coupled with frequent visits to WebMD”).
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personal information.18 These features make electronic devices convenient and
valuable to users, but they also implicate Fourth Amendment issues concerning
the amount and types of data that searches of these devices may reveal.19
The unique nature of electronic devices has particular impact on one area of
Fourth Amendment law: the private search doctrine. The private search
doctrine provides that government agents may, without first obtaining a
warrant, reproduce a search performed by a private individual.20 However,
courts faced abundant litigation regarding whether a subsequent government
search exceeded the scope of an initial private search, even in the preelectronic device context.21 The distinctive characteristics of electronic devices
create an additional challenge for courts determining the scope of private
searches. Courts have developed two dominant approaches for confronting this
challenge: the container approach and the particularity approach. This
divergence has created a split among the circuits.
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits utilize the container approach, which
analogizes technological devices to static closed containers such as suitcases,
duffle bags, and camera cases.22 The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Runyan
and the Seventh Circuit in Rann v. Atchison analogized media disks to
traditional containers and determined that “the police . . . did not exceed the
scope of the private search if they examined more files on the privately16

See id. The location tracking data alone represent another modern constitutional debate. See State v.
Tate, 849 N.W.2d 798, 814 (Wis. 2014) (“The United States Supreme Court characterizes location data as
‘qualitatively different’ from physical records, noting that location data can ‘reconstruct someone’s specific
movements down to the minute, not only around town but also within a particular building.’ The more precise
the tracking, the greater the privacy concerns.” (quoting Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490)).
17 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490 (discussing search histories that could potentially reveal searches for
medical symptoms and cell phone applications for medical conditions such as pregnancy and addiction); Tate,
849 N.W.2d at 814 (describing how the GPS features on cell phones can track users to “doctors’ offices . . .
AIDS treatments centers, abortion clinics” and more places that could reveal clues into the users’ health).
18 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490 (stating that people store “a digital record of nearly every aspect of their
lives—from the mundane to the intimate” on their cell phones).
19 See id. at 2489–90; see also Alan Butler, Get a Warrant: The Supreme Court’s New Course for Digital
Privacy Rights After Riley v. California, 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 83, 90–91 (2014).
20 Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980); Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment
Aspects of Computer Searches and Seizures: A Perspective and a Primer, 75 MISS. L.J. 193, 233 (2005) (“A
government search that merely replicates a previous private one is not a ‘search’ within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment; rather, the Amendment applies only to the extent that the government has exceeded the
scope of the private search.”).
21 See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115 (1984); Walter, 447 U.S. at 657 (explaining that
if the government’s search exceeds the bounds of the private search, it is a separate search and the government
is required to obtain a warrant or prove the search is necessary under another exigent circumstance).
22 See infra notes 101–29 and accompanying text.
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searched disks than [the private searchers] had.”23 The Fifth and Seventh
Circuits’ interpretations of the container approach define the scope so broadly
that they permit intrusive government searches that far exceed the literal reach
of the private search.
The Sixth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Armed Forces opt for the particularity approach, an approach specifically
designed to accommodate the unique characteristics and privacy concerns of
electronic devices.24 The common thread among applications of the
particularity approach is the conclusion that government searches of electronic
devices should be narrowly tailored to the precise scope of the private search.25
The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Lichtenberger, like the Supreme Court in
Riley, emphasized the privacy concerns associated with electronic devices26
and concluded that an officer exceeded the scope of the private search by
viewing more images than the private searcher.27 Similarly, in United States v.
Sparks, the Eleventh Circuit determined that a government searcher exceeded
the scope of the private search when he viewed a video that the private
searcher had not viewed.28 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
also applied the particularity approach in United States v. Wicks when it held
that a subsequent government search should be limited to the specific text
messages viewed during the private search.29 These applications of the
particularity approach refine the concept of scope and prevent unjustified
invasions of privacy.

23 United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 465 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832,
838 (7th Cir. 2012).
24 See infra notes 140–214 and accompanying text.
25 See Clancy, supra note 20, at 203 (“Moreover, Fourth Amendment analysis regarding the search and
seizure of computers must be approached cautiously and narrowly because of the important privacy concerns
inherent in the nature of computers . . . .” (quoting People v. Gall, 30 P.3d 145, 162–65 (Colo. 2001) (en banc)
(Martinez, J., dissenting))); Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531,
547–48 (2005) (referring to this narrow approach as the “exposure-based approach” and stating that
“government agents may view only the information viewed by the private actor unless they first obtain a
warrant”).
26 Compare Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489–91 (2014) (identifying the differences between
cell phones and other objects and accompanying privacy concerns), with United States v. Lichtenberger, 786
F.3d 478, 487–88 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding that “the nature of the electronic device greatly increases the
potential privacy interests at stake”).
27 Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 488–91.
28 806 F.3d 1323, 1336 (11th Cir. 2015).
29 73 M.J. 93, 100–01 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (“[T]he scope of the private search can be measured by what the
private actor actually viewed as opposed to what the private actor had access to view.”).
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This Comment focuses on the two approaches mentioned briefly above and
proceeds in five parts. Part I lays the foundation for contemporary application
of the private search doctrine by discussing the history of the Fourth
Amendment and the development of the private search doctrine. Part II
discusses the Fifth Circuit’s container approach, which analogizes electronic
devices to static closed containers, thereby giving the government access to
data outside the literal scope of the private search. Part III examines the
approach adopted by the Sixth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit, and the Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces—the particularity approach. The particularity
approach is specifically tailored towards the complexities and capacities of
electronic devices. Part IV argues that the particularity approach is the superior
approach. Accordingly, the central recommendation of this Comment is that
the particularity approach best accommodates the unique qualities of electronic
devices in the private search doctrine context. Part V discusses the widespread
implications of courts utilizing the particularity approach.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVATE SEARCH
DOCTRINE
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.30

The current state of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is best understood in
its historical context.31 Section A of this Part discusses the history of the
Fourth Amendment. The Framers’ goals and the historical climate at the time
of the Fourth Amendment’s inception lay the foundation for determining
which approach should dominate today. Section B examines the foundational
private search doctrine cases, Walter v. United States32 and United States v.
Jacobsen.33 These cases demonstrate early applications of the private search
doctrine that inform modern applications.

30

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. REV.
925, 974 (1997) (“[T]he history of the Fourth Amendment is . . . important to modern-day analysis . . . .”).
32 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980).
33 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984).
31
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A. The History of the Fourth Amendment
Understanding the Fourth Amendment and how it shapes contemporary
private search doctrine is best achieved by considering the Framers’ intent,
relevant case law, and the text of the Fourth Amendment. This section
addresses these factors in turn.
First, the Framers drafted the Fourth Amendment to remedy two injustices
that were prevalent in Colonial America and England: general warrants and
writs of assistance.34 General warrants granted officers broad authority to enter
private residences and conduct unrestricted searches for evidence to
substantiate charges of libel against the homeowners.35 Writs of assistance
gave revenue officials the power to freely search any container they believed
held “uncustomed goods.”36 The Framers drafted the Fourth Amendment as a
method of exterminating such misuse of authority by providing “restraints on
arbitrary governmental intrusions.”37
Second, case law provides further insight into modern Fourth Amendment
doctrine. The Supreme Court expanded on the Framers’ efforts and imposed
additional checks on government search and seizure power by way of the

34 Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 220 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 608 (1980)
(White, J., dissenting); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625–27 (1886); see also Maclin, supra note 31, at
939–41; George C. Thomas III, Stumbling Toward History: The Framers’ Search and Seizure World, 43 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 199, 206 (2010). Professor Thomas Clancy discusses the various cases and circumstances that
motivated John Adams to lead the drafting of the Fourth Amendment. Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’
Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979 (2011).
35 See Steagald, 451 U.S. at 220 (“The general warrant specified only an offense—typically seditious
libel—and left to the discretion of the executing officials the decision as to which persons should be arrested
and which places should be searched.”); Payton, 445 U.S. at 583; Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625–26. For an example of
the general warrants used to find evidence of libel by searching houses and seizing papers, see Thomas Y.
Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 562–63 (1999).
36 Steagald, 451 U.S. at 220 (“[T]he writs of assistance used in the Colonies noted only the object of the
search—any uncustomed goods—and thus left customs officials completely free to search any place where
they believed such goods might be.”); Payton, 445 U.S. at 608 (White, J., dissenting) (“The writs did not
specify where searches could occur . . . . In effect, the writs placed complete discretion in the hands of the
executing officials.”); Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance, 30
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53, 77–78 (1996); The Honorable M. Blane Michael, Reading the Fourth Amendment:
Guidance from the Mischief that Gave It Birth, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 905, 907 (2010).
37 Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 327 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Vernonia Sch.
Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 669–71 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260,
272 (Iowa 2010). The Framers were most concerned with “overreaching warrants” and “abusive search[es].”
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 972 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
T. TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 41 (1969)).
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exclusionary rule.38 The exclusionary rule stipulates that evidence obtained in
violation of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights shall not be admitted in
the prosecution’s case in chief.39 The Court later incorporated the exclusionary
rule against the states and held, “all evidence obtained by searches and seizures
in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a
state court.”40
Third, the text of the Fourth Amendment is instrumental in understanding
modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.41 The text of the Fourth
Amendment and court interpretation of that text further illustrates the effort to
restrict government search and seizure power.
The first clause of the Fourth Amendment states, “the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”42 Government conduct
amounts to a search under this clause “when an expectation of privacy that
society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed”43 or when the conduct

38 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (“[U]nlawful seizures . . . should find no
sanction in the judgments of the courts . . . .”). The goal of the exclusionary rule was “to deter future unlawful
police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches
and seizures.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974); see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 217 (1960).
39 See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398; United States v. Weaver, 808 F.3d 26, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see also
Donald Dripps, The Case for the Contingent Exclusionary Rule, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 2 (2001). There are
several exceptions to the exclusionary rule, including “the standing doctrine, the good-faith exception, and the
impeachment exception.” Id. (footnotes omitted).
40 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); see, e.g., Caver v. Kropp, 306 F. Supp. 1329, 1330 (E.D.
Mich. 1969); State v. Macri, 178 A.2d 383, 387 (N.J. 1962); State v. Hart, 841 N.W.2d 735, 739 (N.D. 2014);
Commonwealth v. Szukics, 243 A.2d 198, 200 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1968). The exclusionary rule also extends to
evidence “found to be derivative of an illegality or ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’” Segura v. United States, 468
U.S. 796, 804 (1984); see, e.g., Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536–37 (1988); Oregon v. Elstad, 470
U.S. 298, 305–06 (1985); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 441 (1984).
41 But see Thomas, supra note 34, at 199 (“Indeed, reading the text without the gloss supplied by history
or the Court’s doctrine reveals that it provides almost no guidance on any issue except the contents of a
warrant.”).
42 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (articulating the “Reasonableness Clause”); see also Tracey Maclin, The
Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 202 (1993).
43 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). The test used to determine whether there was a
reasonable expectation of privacy comes from Justice Harlan’s widely-cited concurring opinion in Katz v.
United States. 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan’s test has two requirements, a
subjective requirement and an objective requirement. Id. There must be “an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy” and it must be one “that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Id. However, the Katz test
is frequently “criticized as circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable.” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S.
27, 34 (2001); see also Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing the
Katz test as “notoriously unhelpful”).
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at issue constitutes a trespass.44 A “‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is
some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that
property.”45 Notably, both these definitions include preservation of privacy or
possessory interests and protection against intrusive government interference
with those interests. Safeguarding these interests from government intrusion is
a central tenet of Fourth Amendment doctrine, particularly in the context of
electronic devices, where privacy interests are heightened.46
The remainder of the Fourth Amendment, called the “Warrant Clause,”
requires that warrants specify the places and things to be searched and seized.47
The Warrant Clause prohibits “the seizure of one thing under a warrant
describing another,” effectively outlawing the general warrants that prompted
the drafting of the Fourth Amendment.48 The Supreme Court promotes the
goals of the Warrant Clause and further limits government search and seizure
discretion by consistently holding that warrantless searches and seizures “are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment,” unless they fall under an
exception, including “special needs” and “exigent circumstances.”49
Accordingly, a government official is required to obtain a warrant before
conducting a search, barring any exception.50 This Comment focuses on
instances of warrantless searches performed under the guise of one such
exception, the private search doctrine.

44

See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949–52 (2012). Fourth Amendment law was traditionally
centered on the common law trespass doctrine. Id. at 949. However, the Katz expectation of privacy test was
“added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.” Id. at 952.
45 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113.
46 See United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 805 (7th Cir. 2012).
47 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Maclin, supra note 42, at 202.
48 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 195–96 (1927).
49 City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 732 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355–57 (1967). The Court has articulated many
exceptions, ranging from emergency situations to plain view. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 462 (2011)
(stating that officers can conduct warrantless searches if the search is necessary “to prevent the destruction of
evidence”); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“[L]aw enforcement officers may enter a home
without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from
imminent injury.”); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (holding that firefighters may enter a burning
building to put out the fire and, once inside, “may seize evidence of arson that is in plain view” without
violating the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42–43 (1976) (explaining that a “hot
pursuit” is an exigent circumstance that justifies a warrantless entry); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 465 (1971) (defining the “plain view doctrine” as “under certain circumstances the police may seize
evidence in plain view without a warrant”). Warrantless searches may also be conducted pursuant to valid
consent, subject to the scope of that consent. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 252 (1991); Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
50 Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 454–55.
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B. The History of the Private Search Doctrine
The private search doctrine—and the circuit split regarding its application
to electronic devices—is at the heart of this Comment. This section discusses
the private search doctrine by examining private versus government action and
two influential private search doctrine cases: Walter v. United States51 and
Unites States v. Jacobsen.52
First, the private search doctrine stems from the distinction between private
and government action. Private and government action are divorced under the
Fourth Amendment, as the Fourth Amendment applies only to state action.53
Accordingly, “a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or
with the participation or knowledge of any government official” is not subject
to the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment and may conduct an unreasonable
search without violating the Fourth Amendment.54
The Supreme Court echoed this division between private and government
action and set the foundation for contemporary private search doctrine in
Walter v. United States.55 In this seminal case, a private carrier mistakenly
delivered several packages to the wrong recipient.56 Employees opened the
packages and discovered boxes of film with “suggestive” labels.57 After seeing
the labels, one of the employees removed a filmstrip and attempted to view it
by holding it up to the light.58 The employees then called FBI agents to the
scene, and the agents subsequently viewed the film on a projector without
obtaining a warrant.59 The Supreme Court first addressed the initial search
conducted by the employees and cited the Fourth Amendment’s exclusion of
private action.60 “[A] wrongful search or seizure conducted by a private party
51
52
53

447 U.S. 649 (1980).
466 U.S. 109 (1984).
See Walter, 447 U.S. at 662 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475

(1921).
54 Walter, 447 U.S. at 662 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113. However, the
private individual may face other causes of action for such an unreasonable search. See United States v.
Koenig, 856 F.2d 843, 852 n.10 (7th Cir. 1988) (“The private actor’s search may be limited by criminal law,
by tort law, or by market forces . . . but not by the Constitution.”). The Fourth Amendment does regulate the
actions of government agents—those acting as “instruments” of the government at the time of the search.
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 487.
55 447 U.S. at 656.
56 Id. at 651.
57 Id. at 651–52.
58 Id. at 652.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 656.
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does not violate the Fourth Amendment . . . .”61 The Court then analyzed the
subsequent FBI search and, in so doing, established the private search
doctrine.62 Pursuant to the private search doctrine, the Court determined that
government officials may recreate the private search without obtaining a
warrant; however, the warrantless government search cannot exceed the limits
of the initial private search.63
The Walter decision set the stage for the modern application of the private
search doctrine by emphasizing two factors: the privacy interests at stake and
the scope of the initial private search.64 The Court stressed the intent of the
Framers to protect “unfrustrated” privacy interests and guard against broad,
“indiscriminate searches and seizures.”65 In accordance with this intent, the
Court applied a narrow scope and stated that the private searchers frustrated,
but did not completely destroy, the expectation of privacy in the film when
they opened the box and attempted to view one of the filmstrips.66 Some
Fourth Amendment-protected expectation of privacy remained, and the
warrantless government search invaded that “unfrustrated” expectation of
privacy.67 In particular, “[t]he projection of the films was a significant
expansion of the search that had been conducted previously by a private party
and therefore must be characterized as a separate search.”68 In addition, the
private search analysis in Walter is consistent with the particularity
requirement found in the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment.69 “If a
properly authorized official search is limited by the particular terms of its
authorization, at least the same kind of strict limitation must be applied to any
official use of a private party’s invasion of another person’s privacy.”70

61

Id.
Id. at 656–57.
63 Id. (explaining that if the Government’s search surpasses the limits of the private search, it is
considered a separate, independent search).
64 See id. at 657–59.
65 Id. (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980)).
66 Id. at 659; see also Lynn M. Gagel, Stealthy Encroachments Upon the Fourth Amendment:
Constitutional Constraints and Their Applicability to the Long Arm of Ohio’s Private Security Forces, 63 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1807, 1825 (1995) (“A government search following a private invasion is only justifiable—or
authorized—because the private party has thwarted any privacy interest of the party being searched.”).
67 See Walter, 447 U.S. at 659.
68 Id. at 657; see also Gagel, supra note 66, at 1825 (“The Court concluded that if the government
overreaches the bounds of the initial private party search . . . it oversteps its initial authorization and, without
additional justification, violates the Fourth Amendment.”).
69 See Walter, 447 U.S. at 657 (stating that “[the Fourth] Amendment requires that the scope of every
authorized search be particularly described”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
70 Walter, 447 U.S. at 657.
62
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Four years later, in United States v. Jacobsen, the Court revisited the
private search doctrine.71 Employees for a private carrier were inspecting a
cardboard box for damage when they discovered a tube made of duct tape.72
The employees slit open the tube and observed several plastic bags containing
a white, powdery substance.73 The employees placed the plastic bags and the
tube back into the cardboard box and notified the DEA.74 Without first
obtaining a warrant, a DEA agent removed the plastic bags from the previously
cut-open tube, opened each of the bags, and conducted a field test to confirm
that the powder was cocaine.75
First, the Court addressed the initial private search conducted by the
employees and found that the Fourth Amendment’s inapplicability to private
action extended to the search conducted by the employees in the instant case.76
Then, the Court analyzed the subsequent government search to determine
whether the government search infringed upon any expectation of privacy that
was not frustrated by the private search.77 To reach its determination, the Court
stated that government searches pursuant to the private search doctrine “must
be tested by the degree to which they exceeded the scope of the private
search.”78 Specifically, government officials violate the Fourth Amendment if
they expand the scope of the government search to include items with an
unfrustrated expectation of privacy.79 The Court applied this rule to the
circumstances of the case and determined that the employees frustrated the
privacy interest in the contents of the package when they cut open the tube,
removed the plastic bags, and called the DEA.80 Thus, the agent did not
infringe upon any unfrustrated privacy interest when he removed the bags from
71

466 U.S. 109, 115–18 (1984).
Id. at 111.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 111–12.
76 Id. at 114–15 (“Whether [the initial invasions by the employees] were accidental or deliberate, and
whether they were reasonable or unreasonable, they did not violate the Fourth Amendment because of their
private character.” (footnote omitted)).
77 See id. at 115–18 (explaining that if someone exposes private information to a third party, his
expectation of privacy in that information is frustrated and the government may use that “now nonprivate
information” without obtaining a warrant, but if the expectation of privacy has not been frustrated in some
information, the government may not use that information without obtaining a warrant).
78 Id. at 115–17 (explaining that this rule stems from the rule that when “frustration of the original
expectation of privacy occurs, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit government use of the now nonprivate
information”).
79 See id. at 117 (“The Fourth Amendment is implicated only if the authorities use information with
respect to which the expectation of privacy has not already been frustrated.”).
80 Id. at 119.
72
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the tube.81 The Court also considered what information the agent stood to gain
from the re-examination and concluded that the agent was not poised to
discover anything he did not already know.82 For the preceding reasons, the
Court concluded that the government agent did not exceed the scope of the
private search, nor did the government search violate the Fourth Amendment.83
Both Walter and Jacobsen highlight the scope of the initial private search.
However, determining the scope of private searches in the context of twentyfirst century technology has proven controversial.84 The remainder of this
Comment surveys and assesses two dominant approaches that courts utilize in
determining the scope of private searches of electronic devices.
II. THE CONTAINER APPROACH
Some courts apply traditional private search doctrine rules—typically used
in the context of static containers—to private searches of electronic devices, in
an approach this Comment refers to as the “container approach.” Section A
introduces the container approach. Section B details the Fifth Circuit’s
application of the container approach. Section C describes the Seventh
Circuit’s application of the container approach.
A. Description of the Container Approach
“[A] ‘container’ has been defined as ‘any object capable of holding another
object.’”85 Due to the dearth in case law and the unresolved questions relating
to the scope of a private search involving electronic devices,86 courts adopting
the container approach attempt to incorporate technology under the broad
umbrella of this container definition. These courts thereby endeavor to
81

Id. at 119–20.
Id. at 120 (explaining that the agent did not learn anything from the government search that “had not
previously been learned during the private search”).
83 Id. (“It infringed no legitimate expectation of privacy and hence was not a ‘search’ within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.”).
84 Compare United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2015) (acknowledging that
laptops are intrinsically different from standard containers), and United States v. Wicks, 73 M.J. 93, 102
(C.A.A.F. 2014) (differentiating cell phones from “static storage containers” because of the likelihood of “vast
amount[s] of personal data” stored on cell phones), with United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 462–64 (5th
Cir. 2001) (treating computer disks as standard containers and using container case law to address the private
search of computer disks).
85 People v. Michael E., 178 Cal. Rptr. 3d 467, 479 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Riley v. California,
134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014)).
86 See also Clancy, supra note 20, at 236–40 (stating that the issue of scope of a private search involving
computers has resulted in “contradictory results”).
82
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streamline the issue of scope for private searches involving electronic devices,
which the historical framework of the private search doctrine left open to
“questionable results.” 87
Courts applying the container approach draw parallels between electronic
devices—which they argue are just digital containers—and conventional
closed containers at the heart of historical private search jurisprudence.88 One
traditional container rule frequently used in these analogies gives government
officials broad authority to view all of the contents of a container if a private
searcher merely opens that container.89 This rule is justified on the basis of the
subsequent government merely being more “thorough”; thus, a government
search “[does] not exceed the scope of the prior private searches for Fourth
Amendment purposes simply because they took more time and were more
thorough than the [private searchers].”90
Courts have also addressed the question of scope in traditional private
search cases involving multiple containers.91 One such case determined that an
officer exceeds the scope of the private search if he opens a separate, unopened
container found inside a larger container that the private searcher did open.92
Other cases involve identical closed packages, at least one of which the private
searcher opened.93 In such cases, government agents may open any identical

87

See id. at 233 (stating that the private search doctrine left a gap when it came to computers and that
“[t]he application of [the private search doctrine] in the computer context has sometimes led to questionable
results”). Courts using the container approach seek to fill this void using an analogy to containers and existing
rules. However, this Comment argues that this approach still results in “questionable” outcomes.
88 Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832, 838 (7th Cir. 2012) (relying on the Runyan decision to analyze the
private search of media devices under traditional container theories); United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449,
462–64 (5th Cir. 2001) (applying container case law to computer disks). There are many private search
doctrine cases involving containers for container approach supporters to rely upon in their analogies. See, e.g.,
United States v. Oliver, 630 F.3d 397, 406–08 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Donnes, 947 F.2d 1430, 1439
(10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Bowman, 907 F.2d 63, 65 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Gricco, No.
CR.A. 01-90, 2002 WL 393115, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2002).
89 See Gricco, 2002 WL 393115, at *10–11 (holding that the government search of all the items in a
container does not exceed the scope of the private search where the private searcher merely opened the trunk
and saw guns). This rule is also consistent with the holding of static container case Jacobsen, which stated that
government officials may conduct a warrantless search of a container in which the privacy interest has already
been frustrated when a private searcher opened the container. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109,
115–17 (1984).
90 United States v. Simpson, 904 F.2d 607, 610 (11th Cir. 1990).
91 See, e.g., Oliver, 630 F.3d at 408; Donnes, 947 F.2d at 1439; Bowman, 907 F.2d at 65.
92 See Donnes, 947 F.2d at 1439 (holding that “by removing the lens case from the glove, and then
opening the lens case, the officer exceeded the scope of the private search”).
93 See, e.g., Bowman, 907 F.2d at 65.
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bundles if factors render the contents of the identical bundles obvious.94 These
factors include whether there are any identifying indicators on the outside of
the container, whether there is any information that could hint at the contents,
and whether the government officials’ experience provides insight into the
contents.95 For example, the Fifth Circuit applied these factors to an
unsearched notebook inside an opened container.96 The court concluded that an
identifying label on the cover of the notebook, a protruding piece of paper, and
the government officials’ training rendered the contents of the notebook
“obvious.”97 Because the contents were “obvious,” the court held that the
government officials did not conduct a separate, unconstitutional search in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.98
Courts employing the container approach implement these and other
traditional private search doctrine standards in the context of technology by
likening electronic devices to closed containers.99 The container approach, in
effect, suggests that this direct analogy belies any notion that these devices
require a specialized approach.100 However, while the container approach
successfully simplifies the task of determining the private search doctrine’s
scope for electronic devices, it also minimizes the unique privacy concerns
associated with technology and permits exceedingly intrusive government
searches.

94 See id. (“The presence of the cocaine in the exposed bundle ‘spoke volumes as to [the] contents [of the
remaining bundles]—particularly to the trained eye of the officer.’” (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. 109, 121 (1984)).
95 See Oliver, 630 F.3d at 408.
96 See id. (explaining that the unsearched notebook was found within a box that a private searcher
opened).
97 Id.
98 Id. (“Because the notebook’s contents were obvious, agents did not exceed the scope of [the private
searcher’s] private search.”).
99 See United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 458 (5th Cir. 2001) (analyzing the computer disks under
traditional static container case law because neither side contested the point).
100 The container analogy suggests that rules for traditional containers are just as applicable to electronic
devices. See also Clancy, supra note 20, at 195–96 (suggesting that “computers are containers” and that “the
traditional standards of the Fourth Amendment regulate obtaining the evidence in containers that happen to be
computers”). It should be noted that Professor Clancy rejects a “special approach” and advocates for a specific
container analogy in the private search context—an analogy between computers and filing cabinets. Id. at 240
(“If computers are containers that hold various forms of information, then there is no principled distinction
between them and a metal filing cabinet when applying the private search doctrine. That is to say that the rules
regulating containers in the bricks and mortar world have equal applicability to computer searches.”).
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B. The Fifth Circuit’s Application of the Container Approach
The Fifth Circuit applied the container approach in United States v.
Runyan.101 The search at issue in Runyan involved two private searchers and
numerous media storage devices.102 The first private searcher entered the
defendant’s property to retrieve some of her items but, instead, removed a
duffle bag containing pornography and several media storage disks.103 She and
several friends later returned to the defendant’s property and took a computer,
floppy disks, CDs, and ZIP drives.104
The second private searcher searched about twenty of the CDs and floppy
disks but none of the ZIP drives.105 Her private search revealed images of child
pornography, so she handed over to the police more than forty CDs, floppy
disks, and ZIP drives.106 Notably, she gave the police significantly more disks
than she opened in her private search.107 The first private searcher later gave
the police additional CDs, the black duffle bag, the computer, and other items
found on the defendant’s property.108
A government agent viewed images from every CD, floppy disk, and ZIP
drive received from the two private searchers.109 Only then did he apply for
warrants to search the computer, the disks, and the defendant’s property.110 A
judge granted the warrants, and the defendant was subsequently indicted.111
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence on the basis that the
government agent violated his Fourth Amendment rights by searching all of

101 See 275 F.3d at 463–65. It is important to note that the court utilized the container approach “[b]ecause
neither party contest[ed] this point.” Id. at 458 (“The government concedes that the disks found in the office
near the computer are ‘containers’ and that the standards governing closed container searches are applicable.”).
Despite the Fifth Circuit’s “assum[ing] without deciding” status, this Comment will reference the Fifth
Circuit’s utilization of the container approach, as is consistent with the opinion’s treatment of disks as
containers. Id.
102 Id. at 453.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. (stating that she viewed approximately twenty of the CDs and floppy disks but turned over to the
police over forty CDs, ZIP disks, and floppy disks).
108 Id.
109 Id. at 454.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 455.
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the disks, but the trial court denied the motion.112 The defendant was convicted
and appealed his convictions to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.113
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court utilized the container approach to
determine whether the government search exceeded the scope of the private
search.114 In applying the container approach, the Runyan court categorized the
evidence into two classes: (1) the disks that were not opened during the private
search, and (2) the images that were not viewed but that were on disks opened
during the private search.115
The court first focused on disks that the private searchers did not open.116
In keeping with the container approach, the court applied a standard typically
used in the context of traditional containers to the media disks at issue in
Runyan.117 This standard states that a government search of a closed container
does not constitute a separate search if the government officials are
“substantially certain” of its contents.118 The court applied this traditional
standard to the disks at issue and determined that the government officials
were not “substantially certain” of the contents of the disks that were not
opened during the private search.119
Next, the court considered whether the government officials exceeded the
scope when they viewed more images on each disk than the private

112

Id.
Id.
114 See id. at 462–65; Benjamin Holley, Note, Digitizing the Fourth Amendment: Limiting the Private
Search Exception in Computer Investigations, 96 VA. L. REV. 677, 695 (2010) (“[The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals] applied the closed-container analogy to digital storage.”).
115 Runyan, 275 F.3d at 461. The court addressed three issues: (1) whether the government search of disks
that were not opened during the private search but that were similar to those opened during the private search
exceeds the scope of the private search; (2) whether the government search of more images on a disk than the
private searcher viewed exceeds the scope of the private search; and (3) whether government searchers’
identification of the person in an image that the private searchers could not identify exceeds the scope of the
private search. Id. at 461–62. However, only the first two prongs of the court’s analysis are relevant to the
scope of this Comment—the private search doctrine as it relates to electronic devices and technology.
116 Id. at 462.
117 Id. at 463–64 (“[T]he police exceed the scope of a prior private search when they examine a closed
container that was not opened by the private searchers unless the police are already substantially certain of
what is inside that container based on the statements of the private searchers, their replication of the private
search, and their expertise.”).
118 Id. at 463. If the contents of a container are obvious, then the expectation of privacy is frustrated. See
id. at 463–64.
119 Id. at 464 (explaining that the police could not have known the contents because there were no
identifying labels and the private searcher testified that she did not know what was on the disks that she did not
open).
113
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searchers.120 In its analysis, the court utilized a traditional container rule, which
provides that a more thorough government search does not exceed the scope of
the private search.121 The Fifth Circuit Court expanded this traditional
container proposition to media disks and likened each disk to a closed
container.122 Thus, the government’s search of additional images on each disk
was merely more thorough and did not exceed the scope of the private searches
because the expectation of privacy in all the contents of the disks was
frustrated when the private searchers merely opened the disks.123
By means of the two-pronged analysis discussed above, the Runyan court
applied the container approach.124 Runyan proposes that constitutional
subsequent government searches cannot extend to unopened electronic devices
but may cover more files on opened devices.125 By allowing government
searchers to warrantlessly access all of the data on a device that was only
partially searched by a private individual, this case demonstrates the
permissive government intrusions endorsed by the container approach. Further,
the government search far exceeded the literal scope of the private search by
including files that the private searchers did not open. Applying this holding to
searches of cell phones or computers, it follows that government searchers can
warrantlessly search all the content on that device where the private searcher
merely opens one file on the device. This type of government intrusion is
reminiscent of the broad searches that the Framers intended to eradicate by
drafting the Fourth Amendment.
C. The Seventh Circuit’s Application of the Container Approach
The Seventh Circuit mimicked the permissive searches allowed in Runyan
in a case involving the private search of images on a camera memory card and
a ZIP drive.126 In Rann v. Atchison, the court adopted the Fifth Circuit’s
container approach and held that, “even if the police more thoroughly searched
120

Id.
Id. (“[T]he police do not exceed the scope of a prior private search when they examine the same
materials that were examined by the private searchers, but they examine these materials more thoroughly than
did the private parties.”). This analysis is consistent with the Jacobsen Court’s finding that once a private
searcher opened the tube, the expectation of privacy in the contents of that tube was frustrated. See 466 U.S.
109, 119–20 (1984).
122 See Runyan, 275 F.3d at 464–65.
123 See id. (“Thus, the police do not engage in a new ‘search’ for Fourth Amendment purposes each time
they examine a particular item found within the container.”).
124 See id. at 462–65.
125 See id.
126 See Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832, 834, 838 (7th Cir. 2012).
121
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the digital media devices than [the private searchers] did and viewed images
that [the private searchers] had not viewed, per the holding in Runyan, the
police search did not exceed or expand the scope of the initial private
searches.”127 The court also applied the “substantially certain” test, which was
arguably an application of circular logic, and concluded that the government
searchers were “substantially certain” of the contents of the disks because the
private searchers knew the contents; therefore, the government searchers did
not violate the Fourth Amendment.128 Further, the court stressed the policy
implications of the Runyan container approach decision—“[The Runyan
decision] ‘is sensible because it preserves the competing objectives underlying
the Fourth Amendment’s protections against warrantless police searches.’”129
Despite this argued rationale for the container approach, allowing broad,
expansive searches of electronic devices implicates dangers that cannot be
justified under the Fourth Amendment.
III. THE PARTICULARITY APPROACH
Alternatively, some courts challenged with interpreting the scope of a
private search in the technology era apply what this Comment refers to as the
“particularity approach.”130 This approach promotes new private search rules
specifically designed to accommodate the unique complexities of electronic
devices.131 Section A describes the particularity approach. Section B examines
127

Id. at 838.
See id. This Comment suggests that this reasoning was circular, as the court determined that the police
were “substantially certain” of the contents because the private searchers were “substantially certain” of the
contents. Id. However, other courts have applied the “substantially certain” test in the context of electronic
devices and have reached decisions that are seemingly inconsistent with Runyan and Rann. See, e.g., United
States v. Crist, 627 F. Supp. 2d 575, 585–87 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (holding that the government search of a
computer “exceeded the scope of the private search because the Government was not substantially certain the
computer contained only contraband”); People v. Michael E., 178 Cal. Rptr. 3d 467, 475–77 (Cal. Ct. App.
2014) (holding that the police search exceeded the scope of the private search because the officers were not
“substantially certain” of the contents of video files on a flash drive). Despite repeated citations to the Runyan
decision throughout the Crist and Michael E. opinions, these applications of the “substantially certain” test
imply that government officials can only ever be substantially certain of the contents of the particular videos,
images, or other items actually viewed by the private searcher, rather than all the contents of a “container”
opened by a private searcher, as suggested by Runyan and Rann. See Crist, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 586–87;
Michael E., 178 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 478–81.
129 Rann, 689 F.3d at 837 (quoting Runyan, 275 F.3d at 463–64).
130 See, e.g., United States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323, 1336 (11th Cir. 2015); United States v.
Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 485–89 (6th Cir. 2015); United States v. Wicks, 73 M.J. 93, 100–01 (C.A.A.F.
2014).
131 See Clancy, supra note 20, at 202–03 (referring to this approach as the “special approach” and stating
that courts utilizing this approach suggest that electronic data searches require different rules and procedures
128
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the Sixth Circuit’s use of the particularity approach. Section C describes the
Eleventh Circuit’s employment of the particularity approach. Section D
explores the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces’s application of the
particularity approach.
A. Description of the Particularity Approach
The particularity approach stems from the reality that computers and other
electronic devices are “fundamentally different from a writing, or a container
of writings.”132 These fundamental differences include the immense storage
capacity of electronic devices, the communicative function that permits
electronic device users to connect via the Internet, and the private nature of
data likely stored on electronic devices.133 The particularity approach suggests
that these fundamental differences create unique issues that traditional private
search rules do not address.134 Hence, the particularity approach proposes
“unique procedures and detailed justifications” to address the issues that
traditional private search rules neglect.135
The particularity approach developed independently in different
jurisdictions, but the common thread among applications remains the
agreement that government searches of electronic devices should be narrowlytailored.136 The most well-known applications of the particularity approach are
the Sixth Circuit’s 2015 decision in United States v. Lichtenberger,137 the
Eleventh Circuit’s 2015 decision in United States v. Sparks,138 and the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 2014 opinion in United States v.
Wicks.139 This Comment first addresses the circuit court opinions at the core of

than other searches). It is important to note that Professor Clancy rejects this “special approach.” Id. at 196.
However, his discussion of the approach is relevant to this Comment’s analysis of the particularity approach.
132 Id. at 203 (quoting People v. Gall, 30 P.3d 145, 162 (Colo. 2001) (en banc) (Martinez, J., dissenting)).
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 196.
136 See id. at 203 (“Moreover, Fourth Amendment analysis regarding the search and seizure of computers
must be approached cautiously and narrowly because of the important privacy concerns inherent in the nature
of computers . . . .” (quoting Gall, 30 P.3d at 162)); Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World,
119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 547–48 (2005) (referring to this approach as the “exposure-based approach” and
stating that “government agents may view only the information viewed by the private actor unless they first
obtain a warrant”).
137 786 F.3d 478, 487 (6th Cir. 2015).
138 806 F.3d 1323, 1336 (11th Cir. 2015).
139 73 M.J. 93, 102 (C.A.A.F. 2014).
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the circuit split and then discusses the first-in-time U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Armed Forces decision.
B. The Sixth Circuit’s Application of the Particularity Approach
The Sixth Circuit applied the particularity approach in United States v.
Lichtenberger.140 In Lichtenberger, a private searcher accessed the defendant’s
private, password-protected laptop.141 She opened various folders on the laptop
and discovered images of child pornography.142 Then, she called the police to
report her findings.143 When an officer arrived, he instructed the private
searcher to open the laptop and show him the images.144 She opened the
computer and clicked on “random thumbnail images to show him.”145 She later
stated “that she could not recall if [the images she showed the police officer]
were among the same photographs she had seen earlier . . . .”146
The defendant was indicted and later filed a motion to suppress the
evidence that the officer obtained from his warrantless search.147 In his motion,
the defendant asserted that the private searcher was acting as an agent of the
government when the officer instructed her to open the images she found.148
The district court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress on agency
grounds, but the government appealed the case to the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals.149
The Sixth Circuit Court distinguished its decision from that of the lower
court by arguing that the relevant issue was scope rather than agency.150 To
that end, the court compared the scope of the initial private search to that of the
subsequent government search using two criteria stemming from the traditional
private search doctrine case Jacobsen: (1) “how much information the

140

See 786 F.3d at 487 (stating that “searches of physical spaces and the items they contain differ in
significant ways from searches of complex electronic devices under the Fourth Amendment”).
141 Id. at 480.
142 Id. She later testified that she viewed about one hundred images during her private search. Id. at 481.
143 Id. at 480.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 488.
147 Id. at 481.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 485 (“Accordingly, the correct inquiry is whether [the police officer’s] search remained within
the scope of [the private searcher’s] earlier one.”). The court stated that the issue of agency should be
addressed after “comparing the scope of the two searches.” Id.
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government stands to gain when it re-examines the evidence . . .”; and (2)
whether the police officer had “virtual certainty” of what he would find during
the subsequent government search.151 While the court acknowledged that these
factors have been at the core of private search analysis for decades and remain
so in the context of electronic devices, it also stated that the unique
characteristics of electronic devices and the privacy interests at stake alter the
“virtual certainty” analysis, placing additional weight on preserving those
privacy interests from warrantless government intrusion.152 Thus, given the
immense storage capacities of laptop computers, the court determined that
“there [was] no virtual certainty that [the police officer’s] review was limited
to the photographs from [the private searcher’s] earlier search . . . .”153 Further,
the court noted not only that the police officer could have viewed photos that
the private searcher had not viewed, but also that the officer could have
accessed other data that was potentially “private, legal, and unrelated to the
allegations prompting the search.”154 The court stressed the Supreme Court’s
intent to prevent that very outcome.155
Given the potential for the government searcher to view data outside that
which the private searcher viewed, the court held that the government search
exceeded the scope of the private search and violated the defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights.156 The dispositive fact in reaching this holding was that the
private searcher did not know whether the government search was limited to
the particular images she viewed.157 This holding suggests that subsequent
government searches should be narrow and particularized to the material
actually viewed during the private search, unlike the search at issue in the
instant case.158 In so doing, the Sixth Circuit set the stage for the circuit split
and this Comment by emphasizing the fundamental differences between
151

Id. at 485–86 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 119–20 (1984)).
Id. at 485–88 (“That the item in question is an electronic device does not change the fundamentals of
this inquiry. But . . . the nature of the electronic device greatly increases the potential privacy interests at stake,
adding weight to one side of the scale while the other remains the same. This shift manifests in Jacobsen’s
‘virtual certainty’ requirement.” (citation omitted)).
153 Id. at 488 (“Considering the extent of information that can be stored on a laptop computer . . . the
‘virtual certainty’ threshold in Jacobsen requires more than was present here.”).
154 Id. at 488–89.
155 Id. at 489.
156 Id. at 485.
157 See id. at 490.
158 See id. at 488–89 (suggesting that the subsequent government search must be limited to what, in
particular, the private searcher viewed). This holding also suggests that the expectation of privacy in all the
contents of the laptop was not frustrated by the private search, but rather it was frustrated only in the particular
images the private searcher viewed. See id.
152
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searches of traditional containers and searches of computers as well as the need
for a narrow approach to accommodate these differences.159
C. The Eleventh Circuit’s Application of the Particularity Approach
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals deepened the circuit split when it
applied the particularity approach in United States v. Sparks.160 Like the Sixth
Circuit’s application in Lichtenberger, the Eleventh Circuit’s application
suggests a narrow, particularized concept of scope.161
The defendants in Sparks accidentally left a cell phone at a Walmart store,
but a store employee discovered the misplaced phone.162 After locating the
phone, the employee noticed messages from the defendants requesting return
of the phone and providing a contact number to arrange its return.163 The
employee contacted the defendants using the number provided and agreed to
return the phone.164 However, before meeting with the defendants, the
employee decided to look at images stored on the cell phone so she could
identify its true owner.165 During her examination, the employee discovered
“questionable” images of a young girl in the photo album.166 The employee
then showed the images to the private searcher.167 They looked at thumbnail
images of all the photographs in the photo album and two full-sized images.168
The private searcher then took the phone to the Fort Myers Police
Department.169 At the Fort Myers Police Department, he met with several
Community Service Aides, scrolled through all the thumbnails in the photo
album, showed them several full-sized images, and played them a video.170
Then, the Community Service Aides contacted a sergeant, who viewed the

159 See id. at 487 (“A search of the information on a cell phone bears little resemblance to the type of brief
physical search considered in [our prior cases].” (quoting Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014))).
160 See 806 F.3d 1323, 1334–36 (11th Cir. 2015); see also Orin Kerr, 11th Circuit Deepens the Circuit
Split on Applying the Private Search Doctrine to Computers, WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 2,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/12/02/11th-circuit-deepens-thecircuit-split-on-applying-the-private-search-doctrine-to-computers/.
161 See Sparks, 806 F.3d at 1336.
162 Id. at 1330.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 1330–31.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 1331.
169 Id.
170 Id.
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images in the photo album and two videos.171 Notably, the private searcher had
only watched one of these videos.172
The sergeant sent the phone to the police department for the city in which
the Walmart was located, and the department assigned the case to an agent.173
The agent applied for a warrant to search the phone and submitted a supporting
affidavit from the sergeant regarding his search of the phone.174 A judge
granted the warrant, and the agent conducted a forensic examination of the
phone.175 Based on evidence from the forensic examination of the phone, the
agent obtained a search warrant for the defendants’ residence.176
The defendants moved to suppress the evidence obtained from both the
warrants, but the district court denied the motions.177 The defendants appealed
the district court’s decision based on three arguments: (1) the sergeant’s search
of the phone exceeded the scope of the private search, (2) the gap in time
between the agent receiving the case and applying for the search warrants was
an unreasonable interference with possessory interests, and (3) the search
warrant should have been backed by more than just the sergeant’s description
of the images.178 The court deepened the circuit split and applied the
particularity approach in its analysis of the first prong of the appeal—whether
the district court erred in concluding that the sergeant’s warrantless search of
the cell phone did not exceed the scope of the private search.179
First, the court addressed whether the sergeant’s review of all the pictures
in the photo album replicated or exceeded the scope of the private search.180
The court ultimately agreed with the district court and held that the
government search of the pictures merely replicated the scope of the private
search.181 The private searcher viewed thumbnail images of every picture in

171

Id. at 1331–32.
Id. at 1332.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 1332–33.
175 Id. at 1333.
176 Id.
177 Id. The district court denied the motions to suppress because they found that the sergeant’s warrantless
search of the phone did not exceed the scope of the private search. Id.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 1334–37.
180 Id. at 1335.
181 Id.
172

GIOSEFFI GALLEYSPROOFS3

420

1/18/2017 3:26 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:395

that photo album on several different occasions.182 Further, “[the sergeant]
specifically testified that he looked at only those images contained in a single
photo album, and his description of the thumbnails of the photos contained in
that album matched the contents of the album that [the private searcher] had
viewed.”183 Thus, the court concluded that the sergeant’s search of the pictures
in that photo album was a permissible replication of the private searcher’s
review of all the thumbnails in that album.184
Next, the court considered whether the sergeant’s warrantless search of the
videos exceeded the scope of the private search.185 On this, the court disagreed
with the district court and found that the sergeant’s review of the video the
private searcher did not view exceeded the scope of the private search.186 The
court stressed the fact that the private searcher had only viewed one of the two
videos that the sergeant viewed during his search.187 The private searcher never
viewed the second video, although it was located in the same photo album that
the private searcher scrolled through on numerous occasions.188 Thus, the court
found that the sergeant exceeded the scope of the private search when he
viewed the video that the private searcher did not view, and the private search
of the cell phone frustrated the expectation of privacy in some of the contents
of the phone, but not all.189 However, the court found that there was no
reversible error because the district court’s conclusion, though incorrect, did
not influence the warrant outcome.190
In brief, the Eleventh Circuit held that viewing the same material as the
private searcher does not exceed the scope of the private search.191 Therefore,
the sergeant did not violate the defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights when he
182 Id. The private searcher first viewed the entirety of the photo album with his fiancé, the Walmart
employee who found the phone. Id. Then, he viewed them again before handing the phone over to a
Community Service Aide. Id. Finally, he viewed the images with two other Community Service Aides. Id.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 1336 (“But with respect to the second video, which [the private searcher] never watched, [the
sergeant’s] review exceeded—not replicated—the breadth of the private search.”).
188 Id. at 1335.
189 Id. at 1336 (“While [the private searcher’s] private search of the cell phone might have removed
certain information from the Fourth Amendment’s protections, it did not expose every part of the information
contained in the cell phone.”).
190 Id. at 1336–37. This conclusion did not change the probable cause determination because the
sergeant’s affidavit in support of the warrant application did not reference the video that the private searcher
did not view. Id.
191 Id. at 1336.
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viewed the full-sized versions of the thumbnail images the private searcher
viewed.192 However, the private search doctrine does not permit a government
searcher to conduct a warrantless search of material that the private searcher
did not actually view.193 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit utilized a narrow,
particularized concept of scope for private searches of electronic devices by
holding that the private search doctrine only permits government review of the
particular material viewed during the private search.194 The Petition for Writ of
Certiorari was denied on May 16, 2016.195
D. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces’s Application of the
Particularity Approach
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces applied the particularity
approach in United States v. Wicks.196 This application resulted in an even
more specific concept of scope than the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits’
applications.197
In Wicks, the private searcher stole the appellant’s cell phone and saw text
messages that she thought were “inappropriate” for the appellant’s position as
a military training instructor.198 Several months later, the private searcher told
the Security Forces Office of Investigations (SFOI) about the text messages.199
To substantiate her claims, the private searcher gave a detective from the SFOI
a cell phone, which she claimed did not belong to the appellant but that held
information downloaded from the appellant’s phone.200 Once in SFOI
possession, government agents searched the phone on three separate occasions
without obtaining a warrant.201 First, the SFOI detective randomly viewed

192

Id.
Id.
194 Id. at 1334–36.
195 United States v. Sparks, 136 S. Ct. 2009 (2016) (mem.). While the Petition mentioned the private
search doctrine and the definition of the scope of a private search involving electronic devices, the two reasons
provided for why certiorari should have been granted were facially unrelated to the scope issue: (1) the
majority erred in holding that the phone was abandoned and the defendant lacked standing to challenge the
delay in obtaining a warrant and that the majority erred in finding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider
the motion to suppress; and (2) the majority’s holding that the defendant did abandon the phone was in conflict
with other circuit’s decisions. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323 (No. 15-7733).
196 See 73 M.J. 93, 100–01 (C.A.A.F. 2014).
197 See id.; see also supra notes 140–95 and accompanying text.
198 Id. at 96.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 97.
201 Id.
193
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some of the text messages on the phone.202 Then, the detective gave the cell
phone to the local sheriff’s office and requested an analysis of the entire cell
phone.203 Finally, the SFOI sent the phone out to a third party for additional
analysis.204 The third party viewed over 45,000 text messages during its
comprehensive analysis.205
In analyzing the searches, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
asked: (1) whether the appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
cell phone, (2) whether the private searcher frustrated that expectation of
privacy so as to permit the subsequent government searches, and (3) whether
the government searches exceeded the scope of the private search.206 First, the
court determined that the appellant did have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the cell phone.207 Second, the court concluded that the private
searcher frustrated the expectation of privacy in the text messages that she
viewed.208 Therefore, the government could lawfully conduct a warrantless
search of those same messages pursuant to the private search doctrine.209
Third, the court determined that although the Government could have searched
the text messages in which the expectation of privacy was frustrated, the
subsequent government searches exceeded the scope of the private search.210
The court held that the subsequent government searches exceeded the scope of
the private search in “a material qualitative and quantitative manner” because
the detective did not limit her search of the text messages to those the private
searcher viewed; the Government did not regard the appellant’s Fourth
Amendment rights in turning the cell phone over to the sheriff’s office or the
third party; and the third-party search included over 45,000 text messages,

202

Id.
Id. (describing how the detective told the sheriff’s office that it was a “consent search” but did not
provide paperwork regarding the consent). The local sheriff’s office discovered that the only information on
the phone was the appellant’s data, which was irregular for a phone that allegedly belonged to someone other
than the appellant. Id. The private searcher eventually admitted that the cell phone actually belonged to the
appellant. Id.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 98–101.
207 Id. at 99 (explaining that cell phones provide communication functions and data storage functions that
necessitate Fourth Amendment protection).
208 Id. at 99–101 (“And although Appellant’s expectation of privacy had been frustrated by [the private
searcher] viewing a few text messages and the accompanying video, it was not eliminated altogether . . . .”).
209 Id. at 100 (“As such, once a private party has conducted a search, any objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy a person may have had in the material searched is frustrated with respect to a
subsequent government search of the same material.”).
210 Id. at 100–01.
203
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including both existing and deleted messages.211 Further, the court clearly
articulated the particularity requirement when it stated, “[a]pplying [the private
search doctrine] to modern computerized devices like cell phones, the scope of
the private search can be measured by what the private actor actually viewed
as opposed to what the private actor had access to view.”212
In sum, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces’s application of the
particularity approach employs an extremely narrow concept of scope,
protecting individuals against broad, expansive government searches.213 The
court also went on to dismiss the container approach by stating, “if one likens
turning on a cell phone to opening a container, then everything within the cell
phone would lose its privacy protections where the private party merely turned
the phone on before turning it over to the government.”214
IV. THE PARTICULARITY APPROACH IS SUPERIOR
The circuit split presented above represents a weighty debate between a
broad, permissive scope on one hand and a narrow, particular scope on the
other. This Comment argues that examination of the strengths and weaknesses
of both approaches reveals the superior approach: the particularity approach.
Section A assesses the container approach and determines that it disregards the
fundamental differences between electronic devices and static containers.
Section B discusses the particularity approach and determines that its strengths
greatly outnumber its arguable weaknesses. Therefore, courts should adopt the
particularity approach, and, in the event this issue reaches the Supreme Court,
the Court should also apply the particularity approach.
A. The Container Approach Ignores the Unique Characteristics of Electronic
Devices
While it has some arguable benefits, the container approach’s many
shortcomings call its merits into question. This section discusses the potential
benefits of the container approach and then addresses its many downfalls.

211
212
213
214

Id. at 101.
Id. at 100.
See id.
Id.
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1. Arguable Positives of the Container Approach
The container approach has several benefits that contribute to the Fifth and
Seventh Circuits’ decisions to utilize the approach. First, it benefits
government searchers by removing the pressure to keep within the literal scope
of a private search. Second, it reduces the monetary and material burden on
government agencies overseeing the searches. Third, it eases the burden on
private searchers. Fourth, it simplifies the task for courts charged with
determining scope.
First, the container approach removes the strain on government officials to
stay within the literal scope of a private search. The Fifth Circuit in Runyan
stated that a government official can search all the contents of a disk if the
private searcher opened and examined at least some of its contents.215 Thus,
under the container approach, government officials have broad authority to
search devices more thoroughly and view more files without fear of violating
the owners’ Fourth Amendment rights.216 Therefore, they are free to discover
incriminating evidence without the worry that they will exceed the scope of the
private search and that a court will exclude the evidence pursuant to the
exclusionary rule.217 It follows that government officials in jurisdictions that
utilize the container approach may be able to admit additional evidence of
criminality and prosecute more criminals than those in jurisdictions that use the
narrower particularity approach.
In addition, the container approach removes the strain on government
officials by providing a degree of flexibility for government searchers.
Specifically, if a government agent opens a file that the private searcher did not
open, he could justify the expansion of the scope under the container approach
because it permits searches of files not opened by the private searcher.218 So,
the government agent could argue that he did not exceed the scope of the
215 United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 464–65 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he police do not exceed the
private search when they examine more items within a closed container than did the private searchers.”).
216 See id. at 465 (explaining that the opposite holding, a finding that the police exceed the scope of the
private search by examining more items in a container than the private searcher, would result in “fear of
coming across important evidence that the private searchers did not happen to see and that would then be
subject to suppression”).
217 See Matthew Allan Josephson, To Exclude or Not Exclude: The Future of the Exclusionary Rules After
Herring v. United States, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 175, 179 (2009). But, deterrence is an essential policy
component of the exclusionary rule. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347–48 (1974) (“[T]he rule’s
prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth
Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”).
218 See People v. Michael E. 178 Cal. Rptr. 3d 467, 475, 479 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014).
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private search when he viewed something outside the literal scope.219 Thus, the
container approach gives government searchers more flexibility and freedom
than the particularity approach to discover potentially incriminating evidence
without obtaining a warrant.
Second, the container approach reduces the fiscal burden on government
agencies. The container approach keeps officials from having to expend time,
money, and effort to obtain a warrant in order to view additional files on the
same device.220 Instead, they can rely on Runyan to view additional files
without exceeding the scope of the private search, requiring a warrant.221 The
ability to search additional files without having to obtain a warrant could prove
helpful in cases such as Runyan, where files that the private searchers did not
view contained images of child pornography.222 In such cases, the government
searchers are free to discover these additional images and pursue legal action
based on the additional evidence obtained without a warrant.
Third, the container approach reduces the burden on private searchers to
view all the evidence on a device before turning it over to government
officials. The burden on private searchers is lower pursuant to the container
approach because a private searcher conducting a search in a jurisdiction that
applies the container approach does not have to search every file on a device
before handing it over to government officials.223 The private searcher could
theoretically view only one file. Yet, that limited private search would be
sufficient to grant police the authority to search the entire disk or device
pursuant to Runyan, which suggests that the expectation of privacy in all the
contents of a disk is frustrated when a private searcher merely opens the
disk.224
Fourth, the container approach benefits courts because they can rely on
existing private search doctrine rules rather than having to develop specialized
rules. Advocates of a container analogy suggest that electronic devices store
physical evidence, just as traditional containers; so, there is no need for special

219

See id.
See Runyan, 275 F.3d at 465 (explaining that limiting the scope of government searches to only the
materials private searchers viewed would result in the “waste [of] valuable time and resources obtaining
warrants”).
221 See id. at 464.
222 See id. at 454.
223 See id. at 464.
224 See id.
220
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Fourth Amendment standards.225 In this same vein, the container approach
proposes that the established Fourth Amendment rules for traditional
containers are also applicable to computers.226 These arguments allow courts to
opt to apply existing case law rather than to develop new, specialized legal
standards.227
2. Numerous Shortcomings of the Container Approach
Despite the above benefits, the container approach has numerous and
significant weaknesses. First, the container approach neglects the unique
privacy concerns associated with electronic devices. Second, it fails to clearly
answer the question of scope. Third, the container approach is contrary to the
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement and the policy justifications for the
warrant preference rule. Fourth, it ignores the fundamental differences between
electronic devices and traditional containers.
First, the container approach yields troublesome privacy concerns that
outweigh the government interests at stake. Courts frequently identify a careful
balance between government interests and privacy concerns in the context of
Fourth Amendment issues.228 The unique privacy issues and the unparalleled
storage potential associated with electronic devices alter this careful balance.229
However, the container approach fails to accommodate that shift—Runyan
illustrates this failure perfectly. Runyan asserts that if a private searcher merely
opens a disk, then all of the contents of that disk are subject to a subsequent
government search.230 The over-breadth of this proposition has significant
225 See, e.g., Clancy, supra note 20, at 196 (“As with all containers, [computers] have the ability to hold
physical evidence, including such items as wires, microchips, and hard drives. . . . Accordingly, the traditional
standards of the Fourth Amendment regulate obtaining the evidence in containers that happen to be
computers.”).
226 See id.
227 See id. (arguing that the approach that views computers and containers as equivalents for Fourth
Amendment purposes is superior to the “special approach,” which “require[es] unique procedures and detailed
justifications”).
228 See, e.g., United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 487 (6th Cir. 2015); United States v. Erickson,
991 F.2d 529, 531 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1972) (“The
reasonableness of any search must be determined by balancing the governmental interest in searching against
the invasion of privacy which the search entails.”). For a recommendation that courts should implement a
balancing test specifically to accommodate searches of cell phones incident to arrest, see Drew Liming,
Calling for a Standard: Why Courts Should Apply a New Balancing Test in Cell Phone Searches Incident to
Arrest, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 715, 729–30 (2014).
229 See Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 487–88.
230 See Runyan, 275 F.3d at 464–65 (explaining that police do not need to get a warrant to search each
item in a container that the private searcher opened and partially searched).
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privacy implications because it ensures that police have access to anything
stored on a device, including potentially private information.231 Not only does
the container approach result in government officials potentially stumbling
upon sensitive information, but government searches also have the potential to
reach vast quantities of this private information due to the colossal storage
capacities of electronic devices. Hence, the container approach encourages
intrusive government searches and broad invasions of privacy, in direct
conflict with the spirit of the Fourth Amendment.
Second, the container approach fails to consistently delineate the
boundaries of the “container” at issue. The container approach does not
definitively answer whether the container is the entire device or a smaller subdivision within the device. Even courts that agree on the application of the
container approach do not agree on what the container actually is.232 Runyan
suggests that the relevant unit is the disk or device as a whole.233 However,
other Fourth Amendment cases, including the district court case United States
v. Barth234 suggest that the relevant unit in a container analogy is the file. Such
cases assert that each file is a “sub-container” inside a larger container—the
folder.235 Still others argue that the container is the folder.236 Disagreement
over the bounds of the container inevitably fosters inconsistent applications of
the container approach. This inconsistency creates a challenge in predicting
how courts will apply the container approach across jurisdictions.

231 See United States v. Wicks, 73 M.J. 93, 100 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (stating that the container analogy, like in
Runyan, would result in “everything within [a] cell phone [losing] its privacy protections where the private
party merely turned the phone on before turning it over to the government”); Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 488–
89 (stating that the government official easily could have stumbled upon information “that was private, legal,
and unrelated to the allegations” on the laptop, contrary to Fourth Amendment intent).
232 See Holley, supra note 114, at 691–96.
233 Runyan, 275 F.3d at 464–65; Holley, supra note 114, at 694–95.
234 26 F. Supp. 2d 929, 937 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (explaining that the private searcher viewed several files
and the police exceeded the scope of the private search when they viewed all the files on the hard drive);
Holley, supra note 114, at 691–92.
235 See Carey, 172 F.3d at 1275–76; Barth, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 937; Holley, supra note 114, at 691–92; see
also Josh Goldfoot, The Physical Computer and the Fourth Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 112, 119
(2011) (calling this approach the “subcontainer perspective” that “conceptually divides a single hard drive, cell
phone, or other storage medium into many subcontainers, each subcontainer requiring justification for its
examination”).
236 See, e.g., People v. Emerson, 766 N.Y.S.2d 482, 488 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (stating that the government
searchers did not exceed the scope of the private search when they viewed additional images in the same
folders that the private searcher viewed); see also Holley, supra note 114, at 692–94 (explaining that Emerson
“seems to constrain law enforcement to searches conducted within the same folders, but not the same files, as
the private search”).
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Third, the container approach is at odds with the warrant preference rule
and its policy justifications. The Supreme Court has long recognized the
warrant preference rule in Fourth Amendment cases.237 While the Court has
established numerous exceptions to the warrant preference rule, including the
private search doctrine, it maintains, “[t]he exceptions cannot be enthroned
into the rule.”238 Thus, even searches permitted under an exception to the
warrant preference rule must be “confine[d] . . . to their appropriate scope”239
and cannot be used to justify broad, intrusive warrantless searches.240 The
container approach is not “confine[d] . . . to [its] appropriate scope”241 because
it does not limit subsequent government searches to the particular scope of the
private search. Rather, it permits government searchers to conduct broad,
intrusive warrantless searches—including searches of material that the private
searcher did not actually view—that the Fourth Amendment, the warrant
preference rule, and the Supreme Court all seek to prevent.
In addition to its conflict with the warrant preference rule and the goals of
the Fourth Amendment, the container approach also ignores the policy
justifications behind the warrant requirement. The Fourth Amendment Framers
included the warrant requirement because, in the words of the Supreme Court,
“[t]he right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of
those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals.”242
Further, the warrant requirement places the discretion in the hands of neutral
magistrates, guarding against the potentially flawed judgment of “wellintentioned, but mistakenly over-zealous executive officers.”243 The container
approach ignores these policy justifications by placing the discretion in the
hands of the government searchers and permitting them to exceed the literal
scope of the private search without obtaining a warrant authorized by a neutral

237

See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971).
Id. (quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 80 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
239 Id.
240 Cf. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 79 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“But to assume that this exception of a
search incidental to arrest permits a free-handed search without warrant is to subvert the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment . . . .”).
241 Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 481.
242 McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455–56 (1948); see also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
10, 14 (1948) (“When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be
decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or Government enforcement agent.”).
243 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921); see also McDonald, 335 U.S. at 456 (“Power is a
heady thing; and history shows that the police acting on their own cannot be trusted. And so the Constitution
requires a magistrate . . . .”).
238
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magistrate, just as in Runyan.244 Thus, the container approach is at odds with
the warrant requirement and the justifications of the warrant requirement.
Fourth, electronic devices are fundamentally different from traditional
containers, making an analogy necessarily flawed.245 These fundamental
differences include storage capacities, privacy implications, and intrusiveness
of the searches.246
Most significantly, modern electronic devices have tremendous storage
capabilities that traditional containers lack.247 Computers can store over eighty
million pages of text, with that number constantly multiplying.248 Professor
Orin Kerr explains that houses, like electronic devices, can store many
different types of evidence, but the quantity of information that can be stored
in a home is severely restricted in comparison to the quantity of data that can
be stored on an electronic device.249 Professor Kerr’s argument250 extends to
traditional containers: the storage capacity of a standard container is also
limited to the physical size of that container. Conversely, “the storage
capability of an electronic device is not limited by its physical size as a
container is.”251 Rather, the quantity of information that can be stored on an
electronic device is prodigious, particularly when taking into account the
advancement of cloud computing.252 Thus, government officials have access to
considerably more information when they search an electronic device pursuant
244

See supra notes 101–25 and accompany text.
See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014) (“Treating a cell phone as a container . . . is a bit
strained as an initial matter. But the analogy crumbles entirely when a cell phone is used to access data located
elsewhere, at the tap of a screen.” (citation omitted)); see also Holley, supra note 114, at 682 (“The complex
nature of computer storage makes application of [the container analogy] in the digital setting problematic.”).
246 See supra text accompanying notes 8–18.
247 See United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2013) (“In short, individuals today store much more
personal information on their cell phones than could ever fit in a wallet, address book, briefcase, or any of the
other traditional containers that the government has invoked.”); see also United States v. Mayo, No. 2:13-CR48, 2013 WL 5945802, at *7 (D. Vt. Nov. 6, 2013).
248 See Holley, supra note 114, at 682 (invoking Moore’s Law by stating that a computer in 2010 could
store the equivalent of about eighty million pages of text, with that number duplicating about every two years).
249 Kerr, supra note 136, at 541–42.
250 See id. (explaining that the storage capacity of a house is limited by its square footage).
251 Shlossberg v. Solesbee, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1169 (D. Or. 2012).
252 See Gordon K. Eng, The Mobile Office Continues to Evolve, 36 L.A. LAW., Sept. 2013, at 38, 39
(stating that Box, one of the leading cloud computing providers, offers “a promotion for 50 gigabytes of free
storage”); William Jeremy Robison, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy Under the Stored
Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1199 (2010) (defining cloud computing as “the ability to run
applications and store data on a service provider’s computers over the Internet, rather than on a person’s
desktop computer”); Mark Wilson, Comment, Castle in the Cloud: Modernizing Constitutional Protections for
Cloud-Stored Data on Mobile Devices, 43 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 261, 262 (2013).
245
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to the container approach compared to when they search a traditional
container.253 The container approach does not account for this storage
disparity.254
The heightened privacy concerns associated with searches of electronic
devices also present a fundamental difference that strains the application of the
container approach.255 Some suggest that electronic devices inherently merit
additional Fourth Amendment protection.256 Pursuant to this argument, the
container approach does not provide sufficient protection, as it affords
electronic devices exactly the same protection as traditional containers.257 The
container approach also neglects the privacy concerns relating to the types of
information stored on electronic devices.258 Electronic device users regularly
store highly sensitive information on their devices, including medical and
financial information.259 Many also use e-mails, text messages, and other types
of electronic messages to share personal, potentially embarrassing,
information.260 As Josh Goldfoot notes, people have always shared personal
information with others, but there were never transcripts of these
conversations.261 However, text messages and e-mails now provide a physical

253 See Michael V. Hinckley, Comment, An Unreasonable Expectation? Warrantless Searches of Cell
Phones, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1363, 1380–81.
254 United States v. Mayo, No. 2:13-CR-48, 2013 WL 5945802, at *7 (D. Vt. Nov. 6, 2013) (“The
container analogy [in the context of searches incident to arrest] fundamentally fails to address the magnitude of
modern cell phone storage capacity.”).
255 See United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 805 (7th Cir. 2012); see also United States v. Lucas,
640 F.3d 168, 178 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859, 861–62 (9th Cir. 2009).
256 See, e.g., United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1090 (10th Cir. 2009) (suggesting that electronic
devices may be entitled to “preferred status,” given their massive storage capacities); Matthew E. Orso,
Cellular Phones, Warrantless Searches, and the New Frontier of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 50 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 183, 223 (2010) (concluding that cell phones “warrant heightened protection because of their
capability for storing very large amounts of private data”). But see Goldfoot, supra note 235, at 164–65
(arguing that computers are not entitled to greater privacy protection on account of their storage capabilities
because “Fourth Amendment protections do not shrink and expand with the size of the premises or container”).
257 The container approach analogizes containers to electronic devices and applies the same standards to
both, thereby affording them the same level of protection. See Clancy, supra note 20, at 240 (explaining that
computers should be treated as filing cabinets for purposes of private search analysis and “rules regulating
containers in the bricks and mortar world have equal applicability to computer searches”).
258 United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 553 (D. Md. 2014) (citing United States v.
Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 964–65, 968 (9th Cir. 2013)).
259 See United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1003–04 (C.D. Cal. 2006), overruled by United
States v. Arnold, 523 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2008).
260 See United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007)
(“Individuals can . . . record their most private thoughts and conversations on their cell phones through email
and text, voice and instant messages.”).
261 Goldfoot, supra note 235, at 165–66.
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record of conversations.262 These types of records and transcripts are unique to
electronic devices.263 In sum, the highly personal types of data stored on other
electronic devices are distinct from those stored in traditional containers,
making the analogy at the core of the container approach even more tenuous.
Further, a search of an electronic device is likely to seem inherently more
intrusive than a search of a traditional container.264 “[T]he information
contained in a laptop and in electronic storage devices renders a search of their
contents substantially more intrusive than a search of the contents of a
lunchbox or other tangible object.”265 As discussed above, people are
increasingly keeping copies of confidential records exclusively on their
electronic devices, which “implicate[s] dignity and privacy interests” due to
the “sanctity of private thoughts memorialized on a data storage device”
through these confidential records.266 These “dignity and privacy interests”
make searches of confidential electronic records feel more intrusive than
searches of traditional containers.267 By permitting broad, excessive searches
of this private information, the container approach neglects the privacy
concerns implicit in the private character of information stored on electronic
devices.
All told, the container approach has numerous inadequacies, particularly
privacy implications that outweigh the government interests at stake,
undeveloped scope solution, conflict with the warrant requirement and its
justifications, and nonchalance towards the fundamental differences between
electronic devices and traditional containers.
B. The Particularity Approach Properly Considers the Practical Realities of
Twenty-First Century Technology
This Comment suggests that the strengths of the particularity approach
outweigh any argued weaknesses, and positions it as the best approach for
determining the scope. This section (1) assesses the many strengths of the
particularity approach, and (2) identifies and refutes two arguable weaknesses.
262 Id. (“Computers’ growing utility may well cause individuals to structure more of their private lives
around computer use, thus creating more physical evidence of what they do from hour to hour.”).
263 See id.
264 See United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 805 (7th Cir. 2012); Park, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8;
Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1003–04.
265 Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1003.
266 Id.
267 Id. at 1003–04.
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1. Abundant Strengths of the Particularity Approach
This Comment argues that the particularity approach is the superior
approach in the circuit split because it adapts Fourth Amendment law to the
unique characteristics of electronic devices and avoids many of the
shortcomings presented by the container approach. First, the particularity
approach accommodates the unique characteristics of electronic devices rather
than disregarding them. Second, the particularity approach takes into account
the privacy concerns raised by electronic devices. Third, the particularity
approach clearly defines the scope as opposed to leaving the issue open to
court interpretation. Fourth, the particularity approach is directly comparable to
the Supreme Court’s influential decisions in Walter268 and Riley.269 Fifth, the
particularity approach is consistent with the Framers’ intent and the text of the
Fourth Amendment. Finally, the particularity approach balances the oftencompeting interests of police efficiency and warrant preference.
First, the particularity approach avoids the inadequacies of the container
approach by accommodating the unique characteristics of modern electronic
devices as opposed to trying to fit them into an existing mold.270 The
fundamental differences between electronic devices and traditional containers
are so numerous that the Supreme Court declared, comparing searches of the
two categories for Fourth Amendment purposes “is like saying a ride on
horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon.”271 The
particularity approach embraces, rather than ignores, these stark differences
and views them as the impetus for a specialized approach.272 For example, the
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces in Wicks highlighted the characteristics
of electronic devices that set them apart from traditional containers and
necessitate the particularity approach.273 Namely, the court focused on
electronic devices’ unique ability to link with other private systems, such as
268

See supra notes 55–70 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 1–19 and accompanying text.
270 See United States v. Wicks, 73 M.J. 93, 102 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (stating that the container analogies do
not consider the unique challenges associated with modern electronic devices); see also In re Cellular Tel.’s,
No. 14-MJ-8017-DJW, 2014 WL 7793690, at *4 (D. Kan. Dec. 30, 2014) (“The danger, of course, is that
courts will rely on inapt analogical reasoning and outdated precedent to reach their decisions. To avoid this
potential pitfall, courts must be aware of the danger and strive to avoid it by resisting the temptation to
rationalize the application of ill-fitting precedent to circumstances [involving electronic devices].”).
271 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488 (2014).
272 See Wicks, 73 M.J. at 102–03.
273 See id. at 102. These differences include the immense storage capacities of electronic devices, the
different organizational techniques utilized by electronic devices, the various protections that electronic device
users can employ to protect their data, and the complex functions that electronic devices provide. See id.
269
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bank accounts and security systems.274 A broad search of an electronic device,
such as those permitted by the container approach, could provide government
officials access to all of these connected systems, potentially including private
bank data and home security information.275 On the other hand, a search of a
traditional container would not include access to a vast, interconnected web of
information.276 The particularity approach accounts for these differences by
narrowing the scope of the subsequent government search and preventing
government officials from gaining access to the linked, private systems.277
Second, the particularity approach circumvents the deficiencies of the
container approach by balancing the increased privacy concerns associated
with electronic devices against government interests. Electronic devices are
capable of storing greater quantities and varieties of data than traditional
containers.278 Additionally, there is a positive correlation between that storage
capacity and the probability that electronic devices hold highly personal
information.279 The substantial likelihood that electronic devices hold personal
information makes any search of an electronic device seem more invasive than
that of a traditional container.280 For instance, an individual would likely feel
that his privacy was invaded more following a search of his smart phone,
including any applications, communications, and financial information on that
phone, than he would after a search of a shoebox full of his receipts. This
simplified example illustrates the invasive nature of electronic device searches
and alludes to the greater privacy interests at stake.281 In keeping with the
particularity approach, the Sixth Circuit argues that these increased privacy
interests alter the careful balance of privacy and government interests, tipping
the scale in favor of preserving privacy interests.282 The particularity approach
accommodates this shift and places increased emphasis on privacy concerns by
narrowly and literally interpreting the scope.283 In so doing, the particularity
274

Id.
See id.
276 See id.
277 See id. at 102–03.
278 Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75,
105 (1994).
279 See id.
280 See United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 805 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The potential invasion of
privacy in a search of a cell phone is greater than in a search of a ‘container’ in a conventional sense . . . .”).
281 See United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2015).
282 See id.
283 See id. at 488–89 (finding that the reason that the government search exceeded the scope of the private
search was that it was not limited to what the private searcher viewed and could have extended to personal, but
legal, data stored on the computer).
275
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approach ensures that subsequent government searches do not infringe on
“unfrustrated” expectations of privacy by extending to material that was not
actually searched during the private search.
Third, the particularity approach answers the scope question that the
container approach neglects to fully address. The container approach
analogizes electronic devices to containers, but does not clearly delineate the
bounds of the container.284 Further, the Fifth Circuit’s application of the
container approach draws a fuzzy, arbitrary line.285 On the other hand, the
particularity approach clearly answers the question of scope: the scope is
limited to what exactly the private searcher viewed.286 It is clear that,
regardless of the type of device, the scope is limited to the particular material
viewed during the private search. Thus, the particularity approach ensures
harmonious application across jurisdictions.
Fourth, the particularity approach is superior because it is consistent with
the private search precedent in Walter287 and Riley.288
The Supreme Court in Walter utilized a narrow scope and held that
projecting the film, as opposed to attempting to view it by holding it up to
light, exceeded the scope of the private search.289 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit,
the Eleventh Circuit, and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces utilized a
narrow scope in their applications of the particularity approach.290 In addition,
the Court in Walter stated, “the private party had not actually viewed the
films.”291 This statement is directly comparable to a statement at the core of the
particularity approach application in Wicks—“the scope of the private search
can be measured by what the private actor actually viewed as opposed to what
the actor had access to view.”292 Both of these statements stress what was
actually viewed during the private search, and determinations of what the
private searchers actually viewed directly informed the holdings in both cases.
In Walter, the statement precedes the holding that projecting the film exceeded

284

See supra notes 232–36 and accompanying text.
See United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 463–65 (5th Cir. 2001). The court implies that each disk is
a separate container, but does not explain the implications for other types of technology. See id.
286 See United States v. Wicks, 73 M.J. 93, 100 (C.A.A.F. 2014).
287 See supra notes 55–70 and accompanying text.
288 See supra notes 1–19 and accompanying text.
289 447 U.S. 649, 657 (1980).
290 See supra notes 140–214 and accompanying text.
291 Walter, 447 U.S. at 657 (emphasis added).
292 United States v. Wicks, 73 M.J. 93, 100 (C.A.A.F. 2014).
285
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the scope of the private search.293 In Wicks, the statement comes before a
discussion of how the various subsequent searches exceeded the scope of the
private search.294 Lichtenberger and Sparks also stress the importance of what
the private searcher viewed in reaching their holdings.295 Therefore, the
particularity approach yields analyses and holdings consistent with Walter.
Moreover, the particularity approach is consistent with Riley, where the
Court similarly determined that rules for searches of traditional objects do not
have “much force with respect to digital content on cell phones.”296 Due to the
unique characteristics of cell phones, the Court in Riley determined “that a
warrant is generally required before such a search, even when a cell phone is
seized incident to arrest.”297 Although there is an established warrant exception
for searches incident to arrest,298 the Court required a warrant to search a cell
phone incident to arrest because cell phones are inherently different from
objects traditionally seized incident to arrest.299 Similarly, the particularity
approach requires police to obtain a warrant before searching outside the literal
scope of the private search300 to preserve the unique privacy interests
associated with searches of electronic devices. Thus, the particularity approach
is consistent with the Supreme Court’s movement toward specialized Fourth
Amendment rules for electronic devices.

293

Walter, 447 U.S. at 657 (“[T]he private party had not actually viewed the films. Prior to the
Government screening, one could only draw inferences about what was on the films. The projection of the
films was a significant expansion of the search that had been conducted previously by a private party and
therefore must be characterized as a separate search. That separate search was not supported by any exigency,
or by a warrant . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
294 Wicks, 73 M.J. at 100–01 (stating that the scope of the private search was limited to what the private
searcher “actually viewed,” evaluating the various subsequent searches and concluding that “in both a material
qualitative and quantitative manner, the Government exceeded the scope of the initial private search”).
295 See United States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323, 1335 (11th Cir. 2015) (“To the extent that [the sergeant]
viewed the second video, . . . which [the private searcher] did not view, we agree . . . that [the sergeant]
exceeded the scope of [the] private search.”); United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir.
2015) (“[The private searcher] admitted during testimony that she could not recall if [the photos she showed
the police officer] were among the same photographs she had seen earlier . . . .”).
296 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014). The Court also explicitly rejected a container
analysis because of the ability of cell phones to access a network of information. Id. at 2491 (“Treating a cell
phone as a container whose contents may be searched incident to an arrest is a bit strained as an initial matter.
But the analogy crumbles entirely when a cell phone is used to access data located elsewhere, at the tap of a
screen.” (citation omitted)).
297 Id. at 2493.
298 Id. at 2482.
299 Id. at 2493–95.
300 See United States v. Wicks, 73 M.J. 93, 100–01 (C.A.A.F. 2014).
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Fifth, the particularity approach is superior because it is consistent with the
Framers’ intent and the language of the Fourth Amendment.301 The Framers’
primary goal in drafting the Fourth Amendment was to outlaw “general
warrants,” which “were unparticularized as to the place or things to be
searched for,”302 and “writs of assistance.”303 The Framers intended to preclude
such broad grants of authority to government officials and to protect
individuals from intrusive government action.304 In keeping with the Framers’
intent to prohibit broad, general searches, the particularity approach narrows
the scope of the government search and limits it to specific material that the
private searcher already viewed.305 The particularity approach is also
consistent with the text of the Fourth Amendment.306 This Comment agrees
with the Walter decision, which stated, “[i]f a properly authorized official
search is limited by the particular terms of its authorization, at least the same
kind of strict limitation must be applied to any official use of a private party’s
invasion of another person’s privacy.”307 The particularity approach
implements these limits by restricting the scope to the specific material that the
private searcher viewed.308 In sum, the particularity approach is consistent with
the goals and language of the Fourth Amendment.
Finally, the particularity approach successfully balances the oftencompeting goals of police efficiency and warrant preference.309 Police
efficiency is a common consideration in Fourth Amendment law, and the Court
has previously expressed the need for uniform rules that police officers can

301

See supra notes 34–37, 42–50 and accompanying text.
Thomas Y. Davies, Can You Handle the Truth? The Framers Preserved Common-Law Criminal
Arrest and Search Rules in “Due Process of Law”—“Fourth Amendment Reasonableness” is Only a Modern,
Destructive, Judicial Myth, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 51, 55 (2010).
303 Fabio Arcila, Jr., In the Trenches: Searches and the Misunderstood Common-Law History of Suspicion
and Probable Cause, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 10 (2007); Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s
Concept of Reasonableness, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 977, 980–84.
304 See Robert J. McWhirter, Molasses and the Sticky Origins of the 4th Amendment, 43 ARIZ. ATT’Y,
June 2007, at 16, 32 (“[M]en like Adams and Madison broadly wanted to protect the ‘right to be secure’ from
government intrusion.”).
305 See United States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323, 1336 (11th Cir. 2015); United States v. Lichtenberger, 786
F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2015); United States v. Wicks, 73 M.J. 93, 100 (C.A.A.F. 2014).
306 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
307 Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 657 (1980).
308 See Sparks, 806 F.3d at 1336; Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 488–89; Wicks, 73 M.J. at 100–01.
309 See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) (“[T]he mere fact that law enforcement may be
made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment.”).
302
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follow in the field.310 The particularity approach provides one such “single,
familiar standard”311 because it limits subsequent government searches to the
material actually viewed during the private search.312 Therefore, the police
have a clear, standard rule for all subsequent government searches, and there is
relatively scarce ambiguity over what constitutes the bounds of the scope.
Further, the particularity approach is consistent with the warrant requirement
and warrant preference because it limits the discretion given to police by
requiring them to search only within the literal scope of the private search,
consistent with the Court’s assessment of the warrant requirement.313
Therefore, the particularity approach successfully balances the interests in
police efficiency and warrant preference.
2. Argued Limitation of the Particularity Approach and Its Refutation
This Comment argues that the many strengths of the particularity approach
outweigh the weaknesses. While the strengths of the particularity approach are
significant and numerous, the weaknesses of the particularity approach are
severely limited. In fact, the primary critiques are that the particularity
approach is unnecessary314 and that it may increase the burden on government
officials.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens argued that a rule designed to
accommodate “future technological developments” in a different area of
Fourth Amendment doctrine was “unnecessary, unwise, and inconsistent with
the Fourth Amendment.”315 Justice Stevens maintained that existing Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence is sufficient, even in the context of electronic
devices.316 Others argue that the particularity approach is unwarranted because
Fourth Amendment doctrine does not provide different rules for other types of
containers like diaries and books.317 They maintain that the lack of special
310 See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213–14 (1979) (“A single, familiar standard is
essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social
and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront.”).
311 Id. at 213.
312 See Wicks, 73 M.J. at 100.
313 See id.; see also McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455–56 (1948); Gouled v. United States,
255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921).
314 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 41–42 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Clancy, supra
note 20, at 217–18 (arguing “that the Supreme Court would—and should—reject a special rule for electronic
evidence containers”).
315 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
316 Id. at 41–42.
317 See, e.g., Clancy, supra note 20, at 217–18.
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rules for these types of containers indicates that different rules for different
objects are unnecessary across the board.318 Such rules may not have been
appropriate in the past, but the advancement of technology has changed the
legal landscape.319 Many other areas of law have adapted to that change in the
legal landscape precipitated by modern technology.320 The private search
doctrine should not be the exception to this evolution.321
Some critics of the particularity approach may also argue that it increases
the burden on government searchers to stay within the narrow scope of the
private search. However, the Supreme Court has previously dismissed similar
arguments regarding police efficiency.322
In sum, this Comment suggests that the particularity approach is the best
approach for determining the scope of a private search. The particularity
approach accounts for the fundamental differences between electronic devices
and other containers, balances the increased privacy concerns against the
government interests at stake, answers the questions left open by the container
318 See, e.g., id. (“[C]ontrary to Supreme Court precedent and sound reasoning, filing cabinets, diaries,
books, floppy drives, hard drives, paper bags, and other storage devices would all require different rules.”).
Conversely, this Comment argues that traditional containers, such as filing cabinets and diaries, possess many
of the same, static characteristics and merit similar rules; however, electronic devices are fundamentally and
significantly different and require rules that accommodate these fundamental differences.
319 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33–34 (“It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to
citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.”); see also
George C. Thomas III, Time Travel, Hovercrafts, and the Framers: James Madison Sees the Future and
Rewrites the Fourth Amendment, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1451, 1452 (2005) (“[T]he Framers ‘could hardly
have been expected to foresee the current state of affairs.’” (quoting Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the
Exclusionary Rule Rest on a “Principled Basis” Rather than an “Empirical Proposition”?, 16 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 565, 571 (1982–1983))).
320 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (holding that there was a “search” when
the government placed a tracking device on a vehicle and tracked its activity); United States v. Cotterman, 709
F.3d 952, 966 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that the “reasonableness determination must account for differences”
between electronic devices and other types of property, like a gas tank or the bed of a pickup truck in the
context of a border search); United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (explaining that there
was a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mails stored through an Internet service provider and that the
government’s warrantless search of the e-mails violated the Fourth Amendment); State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d
949, 955 (Ohio 2009) (rejecting the container analogy for cell phone searches incident to arrest and stating that
“because an individual has a privacy interest in the contents of a cell phone that goes beyond the privacy
interest in an address book or pager, an officer may not conduct a search of a cell phone’s contents incident to
a lawful arrest without first obtaining a warrant”).
321 See State v. Subdiaz-Osorio, 849 N.W.2d 748, 760 (Wis. 2014) (“Electronic devices afford us great
convenience and efficiency, but unless our law keeps pace with our technology, we will pay for the benefit of
our gadgets in the currency of privacy.”).
322 See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) (“The investigation of crime would always be
simplified if warrants were unnecessary. But the Fourth Amendment . . . may not be totally sacrificed in the
name of maximum simplicity in enforcement of the criminal law.”).
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approach, is consistent with Supreme Court precedent as well as the text and
intent of the Fourth Amendment, and balances the interests in police efficiency
and warrant preference. Further, the particularity approach has minimal
downsides—the main oppositions being it is not completely necessary and it
increases the burden on government searchers.323 Given its many strengths,
courts should adopt the particularity approach for determining the scope of
private searches involving electronic devices. If this issue rises to the Supreme
Court, the Court should adopt the particularity approach.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PARTICULARITY APPROACH AS THE LEADING
APPROACH
If the particularity approach became the leading approach, the implications
would be widespread. As the following sections discuss, the implications
would reach courts, searchers, and, ultimately, electronic device users.
A. Implications for Courts
First, the Supreme Court’s application of the particularity approach would
impact lower courts. Courts that already utilize the particularity approach, such
as the Sixth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit, and the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces, would continue to interpret the scope narrowly and preserve the
expectation of privacy in electronic devices, while adapting the particularity
approach to accommodate further developments in technology yet unknown.
However, courts that use the container approach or that have yet to address the
issue would need to examine existing applications of the particularity
approach, consider the unique characteristics and privacy concerns of
electronic devices, and implement the particularity approach as the superior
approach.
If the issue progressed to the Supreme Court and the Court applied the
particularity approach, the ruling would have constitutional force. By way of
the Supremacy Clause, such a ruling would compel lower courts to adopt the
particularity approach.324 This domino effect would squash potential resistance
from courts, such as the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, that might continue to
favor the container approach.

323
324

See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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B. Implications for Searchers
Second, application of the particularity approach as the leading approach
would change the behavior of searchers. The majority of private searchers are
likely not aware of changes in Fourth Amendment doctrine; thus, in all
probability, they would not alter their search behavior to accommodate the
particularity approach. However, government officials would presumably be
conscious of such an instrumental change in Fourth Amendment doctrine and
may alter their search behavior in response.
The particularity approach requires government officials to limit their
government searches to material actually viewed during the private search.325
This principle might trigger changes in search behavior, as the more a private
searcher actually views, the more government officials can search without a
warrant. Thus, law enforcement officers might urge private searchers to
conduct the broadest searches possible to maximize the material the
government can warrantlessly search. However, these searchers would likely
lose their qualifications as private searchers because they acted as
“instruments” of the government.326 The danger of this label is that any
evidence obtained by these “instruments” would be suppressed as the product
of an unreasonable search.327 This potential suppression of evidence would
create an incentive for instructing government officials and searchers to
commit perjury in an attempt to hide the true nature of the search and prevent
suppression of the evidence.328 While this would be a potential danger to be
aware of, law enforcement agencies could combat such an incentive to commit
perjury by implementing additional oversight programs and raising awareness
of the consequences of perjury.
Another implication of the particularity approach is that government
officials might change their search conduct to stay within the narrow scope
permitted by the particularity approach. The particularity approach’s narrow
scope requires government officials to exercise caution when conducting their
subsequent searches in order to avoid exceeding the scope. The consequence of
325

See United States v. Wicks, 73 M.J. 93, 100–01 (C.A.A.F. 2014).
See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971).
327 See supra notes 39–40, 53–54 and accompanying text.
328 See Dripps, supra note 39, at 1 (explaining that the exclusionary rule has been criticized as “fostering
police perjury and judicial hypocrisy”); see also L. Timothy Perrin, H. Mitchell Caldwell & Carol A. Chase, It
is Broken: Breaking the Inertia of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 971, 988–89 (1999) (explaining that
police have been shown to “lie in order to prevent exclusion of evidence” and that “police perjury is fostered
by the exclusionary rule”).
326
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failing to exercise the requisite caution is the resulting evidence’s exclusion
from the prosecution’s case in chief pursuant to the exclusionary rule.329 Thus,
the particularity approach may increase the burden on government officials to
stay within the narrow scope of the private search and precipitate changes in
search conduct to avoid the outcome of suppression. However, the public
benefit in protecting individuals’ private information from permissive
government searches overshadows the increased burden on police officers to
stay within the literal scope of the private search.
C. Implications for Electronic Device Users
Finally, the implications of the particularity approach extend to every user
of electronic devices. The Riley case stressed the pervasiveness of electronic
devices in our day-to-day lives when it reported that “many of the more than
90% of American adults who own a cell phone keep on their person a digital
record of nearly every aspect of their lives—from the mundane to the
intimate.”330 These 90% of American adults who own a cell phone, and the
vast majority who own other forms of electronic devices, all have a stake in
preserving their privacy interests in digital records, “from the mundane to the
intimate.”331 Therefore, they have an interest in the privacy rights that the
particularity approach strives to protect.
More importantly, every electronic device user would be affected by the
particularity approach because it protects all users against intrusive
government searches. The particularity approach emphasizes the necessity of a
narrow scope to prevent government officials from viewing legal, but private,
information.332 Thus, the particularity approach protects the privacy of
everyone—innocent or otherwise—from prying government intrusions into
private information, as the Fourth Amendment intends.333
CONCLUSION
Electronic devices pose unique issues that historic private search doctrine
jurisprudence does not address. Despite attempts to analogize electronic
devices to traditional containers, trying to compare something as unique as an
329
330
331
332
333

See supra notes 39–40, and accompanying text.
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014).
See id.
See United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 488–89 (6th Cir. 2015).
See id.
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electronic device to something as static as a traditional container is an
impractical task.334 On the other hand, the particularity approach utilizes a
narrow scope and limits the subsequent government search to what the private
searcher viewed.335 In so doing, the particularity approach accommodates the
unique characteristics of electronic devices. Thus, the particularity approach is
the superior approach to determining the scope of a private search in the
context of electronic devices. Therefore, courts should implement the
particularity approach, and, if the issue rises to the Supreme Court, the Court
should adopt the particularity approach. The implications of the Court utilizing
the particularity approach would be widespread, with courts, searchers, and
electronic device users all experiencing the impact. Despite the many positive
changes that the particularity approach would precipitate, the most vital
attribute of the particularity approach is its commitment to preserving privacy
in a technological era. “Privacy is not insignificant; it is not something to be
taken for granted; and even as it diminishes as our world becomes more
interconnected and dangerous, privacy must not become a legal fiction.”336 To
prevent privacy from becoming a memory, courts must adopt the particularity
approach and prevent intrusive government invasions.
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